The U.S. Supreme Court on Affirmative Action: Are Some of US More Equal than Others (With Some Comparisons' to Post-Good Friday Agreement Police Hiring in Northern Ireland) by Carol Daugherty Rasnic
ARTICLE
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
ARE SOME OF US "MORE EQUAL" THAN OTHERS? 1
(WITH SOME COMPARISONS TO POST-GOOD
FRIDAY AGREEMENT POLICE HIRING IN
NORTHERN IRELAND)
CAROL DAUGHERTY RASNIC*
I. Introduction ............................................... 23
II. Pre-Grutter Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions. 24
III. G rutter v. Bollinger ....................................... 42
IV. Some Comparisons with Policing in Post-Good Friday
Agreement Northern Ireland .............................. 62
V . C onclusion ................................................ 69
I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by
the content of their character.
Martin Luther King, Jr.,
August 28, 1963
I. INTRODUCrION
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided Grutter v.
Bollinger, a 5-4 vote approving the use of race in the University of Michi-
gan Law School's admissions decisions.2 The following week, syndicated
columnist Daniel Henninger opened his column on Grutter with the
1. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Penguin Books 1996) (1946) (using
animals metaphorically in reference to people who received preferential treatment).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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above famous quote from Martin Luther King, Jr., summarizing his view
of the decision with the first two words of his article: "Not yet."'3
The express purpose of the law school's race-based admissions prefer-
ence-to achieve diversity within the student body-was held by a major-
ity of the Court as being a singular compelling state interest that justifies
the use of affirmative action.4 Interestingly, on the same day it decided
Grutter the Court held 6-3 that the affirmative action admissions program
used by one of the undergraduate colleges in the same university was an
unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
Grutter elicited an inordinate amount of editorial commentary, both
supporting and denouncing the holding. The long-awaited decision has
provided considerable fodder for law review articles. This is particularly
so because the Court, in a same-day decision, found the other affirmative
action program used by the University of Michigan to be unlawful. Both
academics and practitioners sought distinctions between the two in an at-
tempt to perceive some judicial precedent as to just when racial prefer-
ences meet constitutional standards.
This paper begins with a brief chronology of the Court's treatment of
affirmative action pre-Grutter. Discussion of the Grutter opinions, includ-
ing those from the trial and appellate courts as well as the Supreme
Court's six different opinions (one concurrence, four dissents), consti-
tutes the core theme. Finally, there is a brief analogy of the most recent
American judicial stance with some of the affirmative action provisions of
the Good Friday Agreement and supplementing Westminster legislation
with regard to police hiring now applicable in Northern Ireland.
The bases for the granting of preferential treatment-race in the
United States, and religion in Northern Ireland-are different, but both
legalize a type of inequality between groups of persons for stated prag-
matic purposes. Nonetheless, there are meaningful distinctions. The
query the reader is asked to ponder is whether unequal treatment might
be justified in one setting but not in the other.
II. PRE-GRUT-FER SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS
This section explains, in sequential order, fifteen affirmative action de-
cisions, with the exception of two, all by the United Supreme Court.
Often referred to as "reverse discrimination" claims, many of the plain-
3. Daniel Henninger, Race Relations Now Turn on Data, RicH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, July
1, 2003, at A9.
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308.
5. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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tiffs challenged policies that employed a so-called "benign"' 6 use of race
to benefit minority groups at the expense of non-minorities on constitu-
tional grounds, statutory grounds, or both. Traditionally, such affirmative
action had the purpose of rectifying historical past abuses of blacks and
other minority groups by the defendant.
Defunis v. Odegard 7
Definis was actually a non-decision by the Court. A white male appli-
cant of the University of Washington Law School was denied admission,
allegedly as a result of the university's affirmative action plan, which ad-
mitted other less-qualified minority students.8 The law school admitted
the white applicant pending the eventual final decision in the judicial pro-
cess.9 Thus, by the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the
case was moot since the plaintiff was in his third and final year of law
study and eligible to graduate. The U.S. Constitution requires that a
cause be justiciable-i.e., a "case" or "controversy" that is appropriate
for court determination.t " With regard to this plaintiff, the justiciable re-
quirement was not present. Thus, the Court was thereby able to avert
having to decide what would have been its first reverse discrimination
case.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 1
Legal scholars have wrestled with attempting to glean clear principles
from the six rambling opinions in Bakke ever since it was decided by a
fractured Court in 1978. One way or another, Bakke provided, to some
degree, the basis for each decision in Grutter-from the federal district
court, to the Circuit Court of Appeals, to the Supreme Court, and in both
the majority and dissenting opinions. The differences in opinion were
dictated on how each individual judge or justice interpreted what the
Court actually held in Bakke.
Bakke involved a claim filed by a white male applicant against the Uni-
versity of California Davis Medical School after his application for admis-
sion was rejected. 2 Sixteen of the one hundred slots for each freshman
class were reserved for applicants who were members of specified minor-
6. "Benign" was the term used by the late Justice Brennan. See, e.g., United Jewish
Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 170 (1977).
7. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
8. Id. at 314.
9. Id. at 314-15.
10. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
11. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
12. Id. at 276-78.
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ity groups.13 The Court decided two issues: (i) was race ever a lawful
consideration in such admissions decisions; and, if so, (ii) was it lawfully
used in this instance? The Court answered these two questions, respec-
tively, (i) yes (5-4) and (ii) no (5-4).
The plaintiff cited both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment' 4 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' 5 which prohib-
ited discrimination on the grounds of race in any program in receipt of
federal funds. Justice Powell, the justice who split the Court, did so on
both issues, being the only justice .who decided with the majority on both.
On the first issue, the four other justices of the majority decided that race
is appropriate on the statutory ground. 6 Justice Powell was the only one
who decided on the constitutional ground, and, being the sole member of
the Court who voted in the majority on both issues, he was the one who
appropriately could write the principal opinion. The breakdown of the
Court was as follows' 7:
(i) Is race ever lawful? (ii) If so, was it lawfully used
in this case?
Yes No Yes No
Blackmun Burger Blackmun Burger
Brennan Rehnquist Brennan Rehnquist
Marshall Stevens Marshall Stevens
White Stewart White Stewart
POWELL POWELL
Anyone who has found the several opinions in Bakke confusing is in
impressive company. Justice Marshall was quoted as having said shortly
after the decision was announced that he "ha(d) seen so many interpreta-
tions of our decision now that it is hard for me to distinguish what we
actually wrote and what the press said we wrote.""
Moreover, the "pro" affirmative action group in Bakke (usually re-
ferred to as the "Brennan group") would apply the strict scrutiny stan-
dard only to race discrimination claims when the claimant or plaintiff was
13. Id. at 275-76.
14. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
15. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2003).
16. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267.
17. Id.
18. Associate Justice T. Thurgood Marshall, Address at Annual Judicial Conference
Second Judicial Court of the United States (Sept. 8, 1978), 82 F.R.D. 221, 224 (1978).
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a minority and the action was intended to unravel past discrimination.t9
For reverse discrimination claims as in Bakke, the Brennan group would
apply "intermediate scrutiny," making it easier to justify the action under
the law.2 0 Moreover, the Brennan group would not impose the require-
ment that the actor had "narrowly tailored" the affirmative action so as
to avoid racial preferences if at all possible. 2 ' The anti-affirmative action
group-usually referred to as the "Stevens group"-would hold that the
strict scrutiny standard is necessary for all racially based distinctions.
22
With its six different opinions, Bakke was difficult to read. Addition-
ally, it was nearly impossible to determine not only what the Court
meant, but also what the actual holding was.
United Steelworkers of American v. Weber 23
Weber was a Title V11 24 action by a white male worker who challenged
a collective bargaining racial preference system in determining which em-
ployees would be admitted to a craft-training program.25 "Craft" jobs,
for which pay was considerably higher than non-skilled jobs, required the
admittance in and completion of training programs that were very limited
in number.26 Employees were selected strictly on a seniority basis, but
with the proviso that at least one-half of those admitted would be black
until the percentage of blacks in the company's skilled workforce (then
less than 2% of all employees) approximated the percentage of blacks in
the total local workforce (about 40%).27 Plaintiff Weber's application to
the training program was denied, while less senior blacks were
admitted.28
A 5-2 Court upheld the affirmative action measure.2 9 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan pointed to the express language used in Title
VII, which read that nothing in the statute "shall be interpreted to require
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment.., to any group because
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 325.
22. Id. at 408 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquisht, JJ., Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
23. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, national
origin and religion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e (2003).
25. Weber, 443 U.S. at 193-94.
26. See id. at 198-99.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id. at 195.
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of... race.. . ."" According to the majority, Congress' use of the word
"require" meant precisely what it said-i.e., that Title VII was not an
affirmative action mandate, but left the issue open for voluntary action.3 1
Since the legislature had chosen not to use the word "permit," the Court
viewed this as being beyond the scope of what was not "required. ' 32
Instrumental in the Court's decision were three factors: (i) the plan was
temporary, intended to be in force only until such time as the racial com-
posure of the skilled workforce at the defendant's plant had approximate
parity with the racial balance in the local workforce; (ii) it was voluntary
(here, the majority seemed to applaud Kaiser Aluminum for having taken
the lead in dismantling past racial practices, although the company had
received reprimands from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs for its racial disparity, a fact which somewhat detracts from any
"voluntary" aspect); and (iii) no white employees actually lost their jobs
as a result of the plan.33
The Title VI aspect of Grutter arguably might point to the same attrib-
utes, since rejected white applicants could always re-apply. Such re-appli-
cations arguably would be futile, however, so long as the racial preference
plan was in effect.
Firefighters of Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts34
The Title VII litigation in Stotts reflected the seriousness of the third
principle in Weber. When the city of Memphis, Tennessee adopted a se-
niority-based system, which would be used in the event of necessary lay-
offs of city firefighters, black workers challenged it.35 Most black
firefighters had less seniority than whites.3 6 An earlier consent order had
assured blacks of certain employment rights, and the federal district faced
with this prior order held the strict seniority basis invalid.37
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the city's seniority layoff
plan.3" The Court found the lower court to have exceeded its powers in
disrupting a bona fide seniority system, since none of the black workers
who challenged the plan had demonstrated that they had ever personally
been victims of actual race discrimination by the employer-city. 39
30. Id. at 195, 205-06 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 205-07.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 208-09.
34. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
35. Id. at 566-68.
36. Id. at 567.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 565.
39. Id. at 568-76.
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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education40
Wygant involved a provision in a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween a local public school board in Michigan and teachers.4' Similar to
the plan in Stotts, seniority would determine which teachers would be laid
off in case staff had to be reduced.4 2 The seniority-based determination,
however, would be modified if necessary in order to assure that the then
current percentage of minority (black) teachers would not be lowered.43
In 1974, layoffs became necessary.44 Despite the provision, the board
used a strict seniority basis without the modifying provision to determine
who would remain and who would leave.45 Consequently, several senior
non-minority teachers were retained, while less senior black teachers
were laid off.46 The union challenged this alteration of the agreement,
alleging that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 47
The Supreme Court held that the black-retention exception to the se-
niority system violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and Title VII.48 Significant to the Court was the
resulting loss of jobs, which the Weber Court found instrumental in its
approval of a similar provision which would not result in layoffs.
United States v. Paradise49
Paradise is a public sector decision with facts similar to Weber in which
a 5-4 Court approved an affirmative action mandate." The federal dis-
trict court had directed the state of Alabama to grant 50% of its promo-
tions to the rank of corporal and higher to black troopers, provided there
were a sufficient number of qualified blacks at the time of the
promotions.5 1
As in Weber, no one lost his or her job, which was pointed out by Jus-
tice Brennan when he declared "[d]enial of future employment opportu-
40. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
41. Id. at 270.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 270-71.
44. Id. at 271.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. This was a querulous position, since the preference of blacks would itself con-
stitute unequal treatment.
48. Id. at 282-84.
49. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
50. Id. at 166.
51. Id. at 163-64.
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nity [was] not as intrusive as loss of an existing job. . . A major
distinction in Paradise was that the method of determining which workers
would be promoted was not one voluntarily assumed by the employer
(the state), but rather one imposed by judicial fiat. 53 This Court's re-
sponse to what it called the department's "pervasive, systematic, and ob-
stinate discriminatory exclusion of blacks"5 4 marked the only affirmative
action ordered by a court against an employer that was ultimately ap-
proved by the Supreme Court.
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association
v. EEOC5 5
In this decision, the Court affirmed a lower court order against a union,
directing it had to achieve a 29-plus black-membership percentage.5 6
This percentage was in alignment with the percentage of blacks in the
relevant labor pool. 57
The Court here addressed what Congress had intended as appropriate
remedies in Title VII.58 The conclusion was that a court was not prohib-
ited from ordering affirmative race-conscious relief to remedy actual past
discrimination in "appropriate circumstances." 59 Characteristically, the
Court neither elaborated upon nor defined what constituted such
circumstances.
Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. Cleveland 61
Decided the same day as Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers, this decision
approved the entry of a consent decree that benefited persons who were
not victims of actual past discrimination. 61 Local 93 is significant because
the Court here approved a consent order, one that it conceded might in
fact have exceeded the lower court's powers under the remedies section
of Title VII.
Such benefits for non-victims were criticized as an unjustified windfall
for those who had not personally suffered discrimination, and, conse-
52. See id. at 183 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83).
53. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154-56.
54. Id. at 150.
55. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 422-424 (indicating that Title VII provided courts with broad discretion
to implement appropriate equitable relief, even in the form of an affirmative race-con-
scious program)..
59. Id. at 444-45, 464-65, 482-83.
60. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
61. id. at 501.
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quently, as an injustice upon innocent non-minorities. This was similar to
the argument opposing retributions to descendants of slaves, and of Nazi
victims during World War II, since those who actually suffered received
no compensation, and those who paid these benefits committed no
wrongs. It is worth noting that this was not a court-ordered remedy, but
rather one to which the litigating parties had consented in the form of a
court-approved settlement.62
Johnson v. Transportation Agency 63
Johnson was unique in that it was the only challenged sex-based prefer-
ence that had reached the Supreme Court. Although the setting was a
public one (Santa Clara County, California was the defending employer),
the plaintiff's case was based on Title VII.64
The city granted a preference to a woman employee, who applied for
an upgraded position of road dispatcher, expressly because of her sex,
even though the male employee-plaintiff outscored her on an assessment
test.65 The affirmative action written policy preferred women for promo-
tions because of the undisputed significant under-representation found in
the workforce.66 Women constituted 36.4% of the area labor market, but
only 22.4% of this county agency's employees. 67 Moreover, the over-
whelming number (76%) of office and clerical workers were women. 68
The plan set aside no specific number of women dispatchers as a goal. 69
The federal district court found that the plan violated Title VII because
it did not meet the temporary requirement in Weber.70 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, viewing the lack of an express termi-
nation point as not dispositive since the defendant county's plan
repeatedly referred to its objective, rather than its maintenance of a
workforce that reflected the overall labor force in the county.71 Thus, the
purpose was to attain, rather than to continue, such affirmative action
measures.
72
62. See Local Number 93, 478 U.S. at 504-15. The parties were the city of Cleveland
and minority non-employees challenging the city's hiring and promotion practices. Id.
63. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 623-25.
66. Id. at 621-22 (stating that the occupation was traditionally segregated by sex),
67. Id. at 621.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 622.
70. Id. at 625
71. Id. at 625-26.
72. hd. at 626.
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The Court was divided (6-3), with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and White dissenting.7 3 Justice White wrote a short one-paragraph
dissent, stating that he would now overrule Weber because of his view
that the Court is now misconstruing that decision.7 ' Accordingly, he
would have reversed the Court of Appeals and held the county's plan
unlawful.
Justice Scalia wrote that the majority had read Title VII so as to have
imposed a lower restraint on discrimination than the constitutional rights
protected under the Equal Protection Clause.7 5 The decision, he added,
had "convert[ed Title VII] from a guarantee that race or sex will not be
the basis for employment determinations, to a guarantee that it often
will. ,,76
Fullilove v. Klutznick77
There had been some legislatively mandated affirmative action. One
such statute was the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 8
which required that business-recipients of specified federal funds expend
at least 10% of such funds to hire minority business enterprises
(MBEs). 7 9
The Supreme Court upheld this statute as a constitutionally permissible
and proper exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.8 0 This pro-
vision, one of the eighteen Congressional powers listed in the Constitu-
tion, vests Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce.8 1
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co.82
Following the decision in Fullilove, many city-governing bodies enacted
ordinances with set-aside-for-minorities provisions similar to the one in
the PWEA. Generally, these municipal laws required businesses that
were awarded public contracts to reserve a specified amount of costs for
minority sub-contractors. The city of Richmond, Virginia adopted one
73. Id. at 618.
74. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
77. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
78. Public Works Employment Act (PWEA), 42 U.S.C. § 6701-6736 (2003).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (identifying those minorities as "Negroes, Spanish-speak-
ing, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts.").
80. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
81. U.S. CONS',. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
82. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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such local affirmative action mandate that specified 30% of city funding
be spent for such purposes.
The plaintiff in Croson was a white plumber who had placed a bid for
the city's contract to install urinals and water closets in the jail building.'
He failed to meet this 30% quota but argued that the only minority busi-
ness who had indicated an interest would have charged $7,600 more than
the figure he allocated to the fixtures.8 5 Accordingly, he requested either
a waiver of the MBE requirement from the city or an increase in his allot-
ment for costs. 8 6 The city government refused to do either and decided
to re-bid the contract.87 The plaintiff challenged the validity of the ordi-
nance on Equal Protection grounds.8 8
The Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional, distinguishing
it from the federal statute in Fullilove.89 The Commerce Clause under
which the PWEA was enacted is an empowerment for Congress. On the
other hand, the Croson plaintiff's challenge was based upon the Equal
Protection Clause.9 ° The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the
powers of Congress, rather than an express power.9 Consequently, in
order for the set-aside to be constitutional, the city had the burden of
proving some prior discrimination within the city (not necessarily by the
city, which would have been pursuant to state activity, since the munici-
pality is a political subdivision of the state).9" The Supreme Court held
that there must have been some evidence of a statistical disparity be-
tween the qualified MBEs in the locality and the number of MBEs actu-
ally engaged in business within the city.9 3 The relevant base, then, must
be the qualified MBEs geographically within the city and not the percent-
age of minorities living in the city or working in the city or both, as the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held.94
It could well have been that the relative extents of the percentages of
the set-asides in Fullilove (only 10%) and Croson (a much-larger 30%)
also played a role in the outcome. However, the primary significance of
Croson was that a majority of the Court held for the first time that a strict
83. Id. at 469, 477.
84. Id. at 481.
85. Id. at 482-83.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 483.
88. Id. at 469.
89. See id. at 507-11.
90. Id. at 496.
91. Id. at 490.
92. See id. at 505.
93. See id. at 500-04.
94. Id. at 484.
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scrutiny analysis must apply to all race-based decision-making processes,
including those that are of the so-called "benign" variety.9 5
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC9 6
Subsequent to Croson, the Court handed down two affirmative action
decisions and agreed to decide a third. The first was Metro Broadcasting,
involving a federal statute that directed the Federal Communications
Commission to give preferences to minority applicants when granting
broadcasting licenses.97 This law was upheld by a close (5-4) Court,
which recognized diversity as a substantial governmental interest. 98 The
Court retreated from its strict-scrutiny position in Croson and applied an
"intermediate-scrutiny," an unexplained change.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena9 9
Metro Broadcasting was as short-lived as it was controversial. Only
five years later, the Supreme Court overturned it in Adarand, another 5-4
decision.
The Small Business Act provided for rebates to general contractors of
up to 1.5% of the original contract amount if they sub-contracted to "so-
cially disadvantaged" businesses.' 00 A non-minority contractor chal-
lenged the federal statute on Equal Protection grounds after a minority
business received a contract on which he had submitted a lower bid. 11
The sharply divided Court held that all racial preferences (to which the
Court deemed the "socially disadvantaged" language to have been di-
rected) must be strictly scrutinized, summarily dispensing with the Metro
Broadcasting Court's aberration into intermediate scrutiny.10 2
Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway10 3
Piscataway was never actually decided by the Supreme Court because
of a last-minute settlement.10 4 This was a case that many legal scholars
anticipated would be the death knell of affirmative action. The litigation
involved the layoff of a white teacher in a New Jersey public high school
95. id. at 494-96, 505-11.
96. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
97. Id. at 556-58.
98. See id. at 548-49, 564-68.
99. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
100. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (2003).
101. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-06.
102. Id. at 227-31.
103. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en banc).
104. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117,
cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
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when staff reductions became necessary.' 015 Of the two faculty members
who taught the same courses-the plaintiff and a black female col-
league-one would be terminated.'0 6 The plaintiff was expressly told by
the defendant-school board that she had been asked to leave because of
the board's desire to retain minority faculty whenever possible.'0 7 She
challenged the expressly race-based layoff under Title VII.' 08
The federal district court made the factual finding that the plaintiff and
her black colleague had equal qualifications.' 0 ' The United States gov-
ernment intervened on behalf of the plaintiff, and the trial court granted
them partial summary judgment.10° The trial was based solely on the is-
sue of damages, since reinstatement was not an issue before the court. By
the time the case was tried, the plaintiff had been re-hired by the defen-
dant-school board."' The court decided upon an award in the amount of
$134,014.62, representing back pay, pre-judgment interest, and fringe
benefits.'2 The plaintiff also sued under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, 13 and the jury awarded her an additional $10,000 for
emotional distress under that law.'
1 4
The black teacher, a party defendant, appealed with the board." 5 Sit-
ting en banc, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a vote of 9-
4116 The appellate court referred to Weber as having held that Title VII's
prohibition against race discrimination is not violated by plans which
both "have purposes that mirror those of the statute" and do not "unnec-
essarily trammel the interests of the [non-minority] employees.""17 The
court held that the Piscataway plan failed to satisfy either of these
prongs.""
First, it was non-remedial since there was no claim by the board of
prior discrimination, a requisite the court read as necessary for affirma-
tive action."t 9 Black teachers were not under-represented on the faculty,
and statistically, they actually exceeded the percentage of blacks in the
105. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1551-52.
108. Id. at 1552.
109. United States v. Bd. of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836, 841 (D.NJ. 1993).
110. Id. at 838.
111. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
112. Id.
113. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 to 49 (West 2004) (prohibiting workplace discrimination).
114. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
115. Id. at 1547.
116. Id. at 1549.
117. Id. at 1550 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
118. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550.
119. See id. at 1557 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-04).
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local workforce. t 20 The court appeared to hold that the board's sole
stated purpose-to achieve diversity, according to the testimony of the
chair-did not justify an affirmative action program.12 1 If diversity was
the desired goal, the facts indicated that it already existed.
Referring again to Weber, the appellate court held that the plaintiff's
loss of job was too severe a price to pay for an affirmative action plan to
be lawful under Title VII. 2 2 The damages were also approved in the full
amount of backpay, but the court denied the plaintiff's appeal that she
should have been granted punitive damages under the state statute. 2 3
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,t 24 and the unofficial legal
"odds makers" predicted the Court would put an end to affirmative ac-
tion, making Piscataway the last reverse discrimination claim unless one
hoped later to persuade the Court to overrule itself. Unfortunately, it
will never be known whether this was a prescient group since the case was
settled on the eve before oral arguments were scheduled. Several promi-
nent national black groups, such as the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), Congress for Racial Equality
(CORE), and the Reverend Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition-offered
the plaintiff an undisclosed sum to settle, and she accepted. However,
Piscataway does not have the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.
Hopwood v. State of Texas125
In a case with facts quite similar to Grutter, the Hopwood litigation
arose as a dispute with the affirmative action admissions program at the
University of Texas Law School.' 26 Like Piscataway, Hopwood did not
reach the Supreme Court. Non-minority residents of Texas whose appli-
cations had been denied challenged the school's program on both Equal
Protection and Title VI grounds. 27
The law school processed approximately 4,000 applications each year,
from which about 900 were offered admission. 2 8 Of these, usually 500 or
120. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
121. See id. at 1548, 1558-65. The Court here noted that there was "no congressional
recognition of diversity as a Title VII objective requiring affirmative action." Id. at 1579.
The Court's language was countered by Justice Brennan's distinction in Weber between the
words "require" and "permit." See supra notes 30-32 and corresponding text.
122. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1564 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
123. Id. at 1565-67.
124. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117
(1997).
125. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
126. Id. at 934-38.
127. Id. at 938.
128. Id. at 935.
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so accepted. 29 In determining which applicants would be offered admis-
sion, the law school divided all applicants into three categories: (i) those
who would definitely be offered admission ("presumptively admit"); (ii)
those who would not, based both upon their academic records and Law
School Aptitude Test (LSAT) scores ("presumptively deny"), referred to
here as the Texas Index (TI) number-a composite of both sets of num-
bers; and (iii) those in a so-called "discretionary" zone.'13  In deciding
whether to place applicants in the "presumptively admit" category, the
required minimum TI scores for Mexican-Americans and black appli-
cants were lowered from the 199 composite score, by which white appli-
cants were gauged, to a TI of only 189.131 The "presumptive denial"
figures for minority applicants were also determined by different num-
bers. For Mexican-American and black applicants, the score could not
have fallen below 179 in order to be in the lowest category.131 For non-
minorities, all whose score was lower than 192 were placed in this lowest
category.133 Thus, this was a two-stage preferential treatment for
minorities.
The mean undergraduate grade-point average (GPA) and the mean
LSAT score for non-minority applicants was 3.53 (out of a possible 4.0)
and 164. For minorities, these figures were, respectively, 3.27 and 158 for
Mexican-Americans, and 3.25 and 157 for blacks. 134 The law school's
stated purpose for such lowering of standards was to meet what was re-
ferred to as the "aspiration" to offer admission to a potential class with
10% Mexican-Americans and 5% blacks.'
35
The second part of the process that gave minorities a benefit was the
segregation of completed application forms into three categories: (i) non-
minorities; (ii) Mexican-Americans; and (iii) blacks.' 36 Thereafter, the
applicant was reviewed differently, according to his or her race.' 37 Mem-
bers of either of the two minority groups received a specialized review by
a committee of three, whereas non-minorities' applications were re-
viewed in a more generalized, less individualized fashion.' 38 Decisions of
this special smaller committee were essentially final, but the group re-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 936-37.
132. Id. at 936.
133. Id. at 936-37.
134. Id. at 936.
135. Id. at 937.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (illustrating disparaging treatment in the review of candidates that fall in
the "discretionary" zone).
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viewing non-minority applicants went through a separate re-screening
before they were accepted.1
39
The federal district court held the affirmative action program unconsti-
tutional, 4 ' although it did hold that the defendant-law school had shown
both the benefits of diversity and the need to overcome past-discrimina-
tion.t4t It was only on the law school's failure to narrowly tailor the rem-
edy aspect that the court held the plan unlawful.' 42 The trial court
approved the granting of additional points to minorities, but found the
utilization of separate admissions committees based upon the applicants'
race to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that the plan
was unconstitutional, but reversed the trial court's approval of the first
part of the plan that automatically lowered standards for minorities."
The appellate court applied Croson and Wygant as precedent for the pro-
position that affirmative action must be based upon remedying prior dis-
crimination by the alleged actor. 45  Using Croson and Bakke as
precedents for having refused to "tolerate" the use of racial preferences
to create the elusive diversity, the appellate court reversed the trial court
in part, holding that diversity is not a "compelling state interest.' 14 6 Even
if it had accepted the law school's position that the state does have such
an interest in diversity, the court pointed to the plaintiff in Hopwood as
precisely the type of student who would offer a diverse perspective that
would augment the educational aspect of the study of law for other stu-
dents. 4 ' A thirty-two-year-old Armed Forces wife stationed in San
Antonio, she was the mother of a severely handicapped child whom she
139. Id. at 937.
140. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd in part and dismissed
in part, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
141. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571-73.
142. Id. at 573-79.
143. Id. at 578-79.
144. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
145. Id. at 948-51, 953-54 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 quoting Wygant, 476 U.S at
277). The federal district court used the entire state of Texas as the measuring base, rather
than the law school as a single unit. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571. Though it was
proven that the state had a blatant history of racial discrimination in public education,
there was no such proof that the law school itself had ever practiced such discrimination.
See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948-52.
146. Id. at 944-46.
147. Id. at 946.
[Vol. 7:23
MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS
was raising at home. 148 The court reminded that "'diversity' can take
many forms."'
149
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor wrote the Croson opinion upon which
the appellate court in Hopwood relied when the compelling state interest
argument was negated. 5 ' She also was the author of the opinion in Grut-
ter where the Court held the opposite.'
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hopwood,152 a procedural
move that usually leads the legal academic or lawyer to conclude that the
Court tacitly approved of the lower decision. At the least, the required
number of four justices for certiorari to be granted did not deem it suffi-
ciently important to re-hear at the Supreme Court level.
California's Proposition 209
In 1996, voters in California approved a statewide referendum which,
once enacted into state law pursuant to the legislative powers granted to
California under the state constitution, would prohibit affirmative ac-
tion. 153 The inevitable test case challenged the statute under the Equal
Protection Clause. In Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the statute.
t 54
Opponents made the dire prediction that state institutions of higher
education, especially prestigious ones such as University of California
Berkeley, would suffer from having a meager number of minority stu-
dents. The fact that there actually was a post-Proposition 209 increase in
the number of minority students at the quite selective Boalt Hall Law
School at Berkeley was later to be pointed out in Justice Thomas' dissent
in Grutter.t55 Thomas was responding to the majority's holding that
Michigan law school's desired "diversity" simply could not have been
achieved without such racial preferences. 56
What principles could have been gleaned from the Court's pre-Grutter
series of affirmative action decisions? At least the following parameters
as to the constitutionality and the legality of affirmative action plans had
been established in an employment setting (principles which transferred
into the subject area of education):
148. Id.
149. Id. at 947.
150. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
151. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
152. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
153. See CAL. CONs-r. art. 1, § 31 (indicating preferential treatment should not be
given to public employees because of race, nationality, ethnicity, sex or color).
154. Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1999).
155. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Id. at 361-67.
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1) no plan had been approved that would require the actual termi-
nation of non-minorities (Piscataway, Wygant);
2) voluntary efforts by employers or governmental entities seemed
more likely to be accepted than were those required by statutes
or ordinances (Weber, Stotts, Local 93 of Firefighters, Croson);
3) temporary plans probably would be viewed more favorably than
those of apparently permanent duration (Weber, Paradise,
Johnson);
4) the Court generally looked on encroachment of bona fide senior-
ity systems negatively unless one redeeming feature of either the
non-termination context or voluntariness was present (Stotts, Wy-
gant); and
5) strict scrutiny would be the standard to be applied to all racial
preferences (Bakke, Adarand).
To further clarify, some of the more significant characteristics of affirm-
ative action plans approved by the Court prior to Grutter were:
1) programs that benefited non-victims, in addition to actual victims,
were acceptable, provided there was evidence of actual past dis-
crimination by the acting entity (Local 93 of Firefighters, Fulli-
love, Hopwood);
2) racial quotas are acceptable when the sole purpose is to correct a
stark racial imbalance within the employment setting (Weber,
Paradise, Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers; but see Bakke, in
which Justice Powell held to the contrary); and
3) affirmative action is an appropriate general remedy and is not
limited to instances where an individual has presented proof of
some need for make-whole relief (Local 28 of Sheet Metal
Wokers).
Whether the attainment of diversity as the sole purpose of affirmative
action was lawful prior to Grutter would depend entirely upon the as-
sessor's view of the precedential value afforded Justice Powell's plurality
opinion in Bakke.
A synthesis of the affirmative action employment and business sector
decisions when the Grutter and Gratz cases reached the Supreme Court is
indicated on the following chart:
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III. GRUTT-ER v. BOLLINGER
The facts in Grutter are reminiscent of those in other reverse discrimi-
nation litigation. Barbara Grutter, a white woman, applied to University
of Michigan Law School in 1996.117 After having been notified that she
was on a waiting list for admission, the school finally informed her that
she had been rejected.' 58 Claiming that this had resulted from the law
school's use of race as a predominant determining factor in the admis-
sions decisions, she filed an action in a Michigan federal district court,
alleging that the process violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.15 9 The
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that both her constitutional and
statutory rights had been violated, injunctive relief prohibiting the law
school from continuing its current practice, compensatory and punitive
damages (in addition to costs and attorney's fees), and a mandatory in-
junction requiring the law school to admit her.' 60
Federal District Court
The law school operated pursuant to a written faculty policy adopted in
1992 that used the usual reliance of a combination of an applicant's un-
dergraduate grade-point average (GPA, based on a possible four points)
and his or her score on the Law School Aptitude test (LSAT)."l' When
the differences in applicants' indexed numbers were slight, reviewers
looked to other factors, such as the student's undergraduate major, qual-
ity of the required written essay on the application, and strength and en-
thusiasm of letters of recommendation.' 62 Applicants were divided into
three groups: (i) those with excellent academic records who were admit-
ted strictly on the basis of these combined scores; (ii) those with lower,
but acceptable scores, but whose "interesting qualities" (identified as
non-academic achievements, employment experience, or other intellec-
tual achievements) may boost their desirability as students; and (iii) so-
called "special admissions," that is, minority candidates who did not fall
into the first two categories. 63
Superimposed on this process of selection was the law school's active
endeavor to increase numbers of enrolled minority groups, specifically
blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans (hereinafter, American Indi-
157. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 316-17.
160. Id. at 317.
161. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825-26 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
162. Id. at 826-27.
163. Id. at 830.
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ans), whose combined scores alone would not be sufficient for an offer of
admission.' 64 The exclusion of Asians and Jews-also members of
groups who had been victimized in the past-was explained by witnesses
for the defending law school as unnecessary, since a sufficient number of
both groups were admitted based upon their academic numbers.
165
The goal was to achieve a "critical mass" of these minority students.,
66
The Director of Admissions from 1979-1990 testified that this concept
meant about 10-12% of each first-year class as the targeted goal.' 67 The
committee that had drafted the school's admissions policy in 1992 had
understood such goal to be approximately 1147%.16
8
The law school expressly recognized a "public interest" in increasing
the Michigan bar membership of these three groups, since they were "sig-
nificantly underrepresented in the legal profession."' 69 The other stated
reason for the law school's commitment to such a "critical mass" of mi-
nority students was to ensure the alleged educational benefits to all stu-
dents of a "diverse" student body. 7 '
Both sides produced expert statistical evidence at trial. The plaintiff's
statistician testified that the relative odds for acceptance (as compared
with white applicants) in the year 2000 were 16.99 times greater for Mexi-
can-Americans, 24.61 times greater for American Indians, 28.63 times
greater for Puerto Ricans, and 443.26 times greater for blacks.'71 Fur-
ther, he testified that in 1995, an identical GPA and LSAT combined
score that would have given a white applicant a 6-7% chance of admis-
sion, would have given a 93% chance to blacks.' 72 Nevertheless, the de-
fense denied that race was a predominant factor in decisions.173 The trial
court found that the law school placed a "very heavy emphasis" on race
and that it clearly makes a difference in such decisions.174
As would the federal appellate court and Supreme Court later, the fed-
eral district court began its analysis with Bakke.'75 The court referred to
the "Stevens group" (Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist),
which had viewed Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause as absolutely
164. Id. at 826-27.
t65. hi. at 835 n.15.
166. Id. at 832.
167. Id. at 830-31.
168. id. at 840.
169. Id. at 830.
170. Id. at 832.
17l. Id. at 837 n.20.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 836.
174. Id. at 840-42.
175. Id. at 843.
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prohibiting any consideration of race whatsoever in admissions deci-
sions, 176 and to the "Brennan group," which read both Title VI and the
Constitution as permitting race to be a factor to remedy past
discrimination. 177
The difficulty with Bakke was determining what might be gleaned from
the several opinions, with Justice Powell writing for a plurality, but not a
majority, of the Court. Only Justice Powell expressly wrote that diversity,
standing alone, could justify racial preferences and that the state has a
compelling interest in such diversity. 7 " He was the sole justice from
among the nine who so held. Not even those in the "Brennan group"
agreed with this position. It was on the "narrowly tailored" issue that
Justice Powell found the University of California's racial preference
under the facts in Bakke to have violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 7 9
One problem faced by the Grutter court was how they were to grapple
with such plurality decisions once it became necessary to derive an actual
holding for purposes of precedent. The Supreme Court decision that ad-
dressed this dilemma was Marks v. United States.'8 ° In Marks, the Court
wrote that when as many as five justices do not agree on a single rationale
for the decision, the holding shall be deemed to be the position taken by
those who agreed on the "narrowest grounds."'' The federal district
court reasoned that Marks was not applicable to Bakke when considering
the issue of diversity as a compelling state interest.t82 In Bakke, the
"Brennan group," while concurring that race can be a proper factor, did
not agree on narrower grounds, but rather on different grounds.'83 A
"narrow" ground could have been whether the decision should have been
based on statutory law (Title VI) or the Constitution (Equal Protection
Clause). The four justices in the Brennan group found race an appropri-
ate factor on the "to remedy past discrimination" ground, while Justice
Powell's reason was based on diversity t 84 That is, only one of the nine
justices in Bakke viewed diversity as a lawful reason for racial
preferences.
176. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412).
177. Id. at 843 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325) (announcing this holding to be the
"central meaning of today's opinions").
178. Id. at 843-44 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
179. Id. at 844 n.29 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
180. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
181. Id. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.36 (1976)).
182. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 847-48 (claiming fundamental differences in the con-
curring opinions).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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In holding the University of Michigan Law School's program violated
both the Equal Protection Claus and Title VI, the Grutter trial court listed
five reasons for its conclusion: 1) the law school had not perspicuously
defined what it meant by "critical mass"; 185 2) there was no apparent time
limit to its consideration of race;186 3) the plan had all the characteristics
of a quota, which the Supreme Court had consistently denounced; 1- 7 4)
no logical basis had been explained for the law school's division of appli-
cants into the separate specific minority groups; 188 and 5) the law school
had not investigated alternate, race-neutral means to achieve the desired
diversity. 18 9
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a 5-4 en
banc decision. 9 ° Holding Marks applicable, the appellate court adhered
to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that diversity was a compelling state
interest.' 9 ' The court also disagreed with the federal district court's find-
ings that the 10-12% and 11-17% stated goals and targets constituted an
unlawful quota,' 92 and that the law school plan had not been sufficiently
narrowly tailored.193
With regard to the issue as to whether only actual prior discrimination
committed by the acting body-in this case, the law school-would justify
racial preferences, the appellate court again referred to Bakke as having
held that such a showing is not the only constitutional justification. 94
The rationale was that, since Bakke was deemed by this court as binding
precedent, the plan met constitutional muster by reason of its diversity
purpose. 195
Interestingly, in Judge Clay's concurring opinion, he viewed the law
school's use of race as harmless to non-minorities, since it had not been
proven that a majority of white applicants would have been accepted
185. Id. at 850-51.
186. Id. at 851 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 and Wvgant, 476 U.S. at 275).
187. Id. at 851 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 315-19).
188. Id. at 851-52.
189. Id. at 852-53 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 and Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280). The
Court opined that placing less emphasis on GPA and LSATs, increasing recruitment of
minority students, or using a lottery system for all who qualified academically were all
race-neutral alternatives. Id. at 853.
190. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
19l. Id. at 743 (citing Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 568, overruled on other grounds,
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
192. Id. at 747-48.
193. Id. at 750.
194. Id. at 738-42.
195. Id. at 739
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without racial preferences.' 96 This was querulous, in light of the statisti-
cal evidence of skewed composite GPA and LSAT numbers that favored
applicants of one of the three preferred races over white applicants.' 97
The three specified groups were understandable in the Sixth Circuit's
opinion, since these were the "underrepresented" races recognized by the
Law School.' 98
The court also was persuaded by the defending university's statement
that race-neutral means to achieve diversity "could not possibly achieve
the same robust academic diversity" the law school desired.' 99 Moreover,
the court was convinced that the law school had sufficiently considered
other alternatives, but the race factor was indispensable in achieving suf-
ficient numbers to yield the goal of a "critical mass."2°
Some mention should be made of the strident tone of the two concur-
ring opinions (joined by two other judges). The first soundly chastised
Judge Boggs' dissent on what he regarded as the court's aberration from
following accepted procedures when agreeing to hear a case en banc.20 1
Judge Moore statement that the dissenting opinion "mark[ed] a new low
point in the history of the Sixth Circuit ... [that will] irreparably damage
the already strained working relationships among the judges. "202 The
reader is left with the impression of a hostile working group, with rela-
tions that, if not already "strained," would surely be after the caustic con-
curring opinions.
A second concurring opinion, though in substantive agreement with
the majority, also reprimanded the dissent as an "embarrassing and in-
comprehensible attack on the ... Court as a whole" and an "unfortunate
tactic that has no place in scholarly jurisprudence .... "203 The inference
196. See id. at 766-68 (Clay, J., concurring) (referring to Goodwin Liu, The Myth &
Math of Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, April 14, 2002, at B1) (explaining that the chance
of being rejected is slightly reduced without affirmative action). It is noted however, that
the Supreme Court in Bakke had reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the white plain-
tiff, who did not have access to university application materials, had the burden of proving
that he would have been admitted but for the affirmative action plan. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
280. Rather, once the slim majority had struck down the plan, the medical school had the
burden of proving that the plaintiff would not have been admitted, even without the quota.
Id. at 320.
197. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 833 n.11 (listing the various scores needed by
minority and non-minority students for admission).
198. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 751.
199. Id. at 750.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 752-58 (Moore, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 758.
203. Id. at 772 (Clay, J., concurring).
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can clearly be drawn that the controversial constitutional sense of Grutter
had been the cause that had provoked such personal invectives.
The dissent was resolute, reminding that the Fourteenth Amendment
precludes courts from such "social engineering" by such explicit condon-
ing of classifications by race.2 °4 He also queried the logic of the position
that racial diversity is a compelling state interest as bolstered by Justice
Powell in Bakke, a deference he insisted was not merited as a reliance on
precedent.20 5 Refusing to acknowledge any precedential value from
Bakke, the dissent accused the majority of expanding the holding in that
decision so as to revere without sound reason "every nuance" of Justice
Powell's opinion.20 6
Further, the dissent insisted that "no matter what analytical artillery is
applied to deconstruct the various Bakke opinions, "207 it is not possible to
perceive a holding any more specific than the University of California
Davis' affirmative action plan, or any other plan "that absolutely re-
serve[d] a specific number of seats for the racially favored," as anything
other than unconstitutional °.2 0  Regarding the quota question, the dissent
agreed with the trial judge that the law school's plan was a de facto
209quota.-
The dissent continued with an analysis of Marks, agreeing with the fed-
eral district court's construction of.the opinion that it was "merely a tool
with which to determine the collective intent of a fractured court., 2 0 He
added that intervening precedent21" has displaced much of the Marks
rationale.212
Referring to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Bakke, the dissent
warned that several opinions in that case indicated no single justice was
speaking for the Court.21 3 In essence, the dissent in the Sixth Circuit and
the federal district judge viewed Marks as having no value for the pur-
pose of precedent and generating confusion.
A diversion into the litigation underlying Marks is instructive. The de-
fendant in that case appealed a conviction of transporting obscene mate-
204. Id. at 776 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 778 (indicating how the majority, using the rule set by Marks, easily
manipulated the holding of Bakke).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 777.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 800-02.
210. Id. at 780-81.
211. See id. at 785 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) and Johnson v.
Board of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (1 Ith Cir. 2001)).
212. Id. at 783-85 (questioning whether Marks properly analyzes the rationales estab-
lished in Bakke).
213. Id. at 785.
20041
THE SCHOLAR
rial through interstate commerce.21 4 The trial court had instructed the
jury according to the definition of obscenity established by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California,21 5 a definition that altered earlier standards
set by the Court in Roth v. United States2 6 and Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts.2' 1 7 Since the Miller decision was not announced until after the de-
fendant's alleged illegal conduct, he challenged the trial judge's use of it
rather than the Memoirs definition.2 18
Memoirs was the most recent pornography case prior to Marks to reach
the Supreme Court. However, much like Bakke, Memoirs was a very
fragmented decision. Therefore, it was difficult to discern the Court's ac-
tual definition of obscenity at the time of Marks. One justice would have
limited obscenity to so-called "hard-core" pornography, two were of the
opinion that all sexually explicit material should be under the protective
freedom of speech umbrella of the First Amendment, and three would
have placed the bar somewhere between these two standards. 2t 9 A ma-
jority of the Court in Memoirs agreed that the material at issue was not
unlawful obscenity, but the Court's rationales ranged from quite broad to
relatively narrow.2 2 ° This is the background for the Court's "narrowest
ground" holding.221 Strictly construed, Marks could be read to hold sim-
ply, as the dissent in Grutter argued, that a defendant in a criminal action
must have sufficient notice that his conduct was unlawful before he might
be convicted.22 2
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grutter,2 23 legal schol-
ars eagerly awaited the outcome, especially since a different federal dis-
trict court in Michigan had decided that one of the University of
Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action plans was constitutional in
Gratz v. Bollinger.2 2 4 Because the Supreme Court agreed to hear Grut-
ter, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet heard the appeal
in Gratz, the Court decided to bypass an appellate court decision in Gratz
and to rehear both. The hope in the legal community was that the Court
214. Marks, 430 U.S. at 189.
215. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
216. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
217. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
218. Marks, 430 U.S. at 189-90 (arguing in support of retroactive violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The revised definition of obscenity in Miller
made prosecution substantially easier, broadening what thereafter might be regarded as
obscene. Id. at 191.
219. Id. at 193-94.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 193 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15).
222. See Grutter, 288 F.3d at 779 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
223. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).
224. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
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would either completely dismantle affirmative action plans or, in the al-
ternative, set clear parameters as to when they were constitutionally
acceptable.
United States Supreme Court
The Court's same-day-but-different-results decisions in Grutter and
Gratz created a classical confusion as to which side won. Affirmative ac-
tion advocates praised Grutter and bemoaned Gratz, while opponents re-
acted conversely. 225 There were prescient "semi-neutrals" who saw some
merit in affirmative action as opening the door of opportunity, especially
in mainstream institutions of higher learning, while at the same time
voiced concern over such efforts because of the patent discrimination
against non-minorities. The hope of this camp was that the Grutter-Grutz
decisions would finally define the extent that such preferences would be
constitutionally permissible, if at all.
One who was in such a fence-riding position was economist-political
columnist Robert Samuelson, who referred to affirmative action as "af-
firmative ambiguity".2 26 Writing that most Americans deplored affirma-
tive action, Samuelson added that these same folks do not want a "closed
society," but that they understand the "heavy legacy" left in the after-
math of segregation. 227 He also expressed the frequently stated belief
that all minorities-including those who have "made it" on their own
merit-will bear a stigma resulting from affirmative action because of the
benefits bestowed upon others.2 28 On the eve of the announcement of
the opinions, Samuelson described his wishful thought that the Court
would "reconcile our principles with our pragmatism. ' 229 It was not to
be.
A 5-4 Court held the law school program lawful.23 0 Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the slim majority placed her, one who had previously been
regarded as among the more conservative justices, in company with her
more liberally-minded brethren (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and
Stevens). Appointed in 1981 by President Ronald Reagan as the Court's
first female justice, she has recently veered to the left on occasion. This
position has led to the unofficial reference to her as the "swing vote."
225. See, e.g., Peter Hardin, Some See Win; Others See War, Rici-. TIMEs-DISPATCH,
June 24, 2003, at A7.
226. Robert Samuelson, Affirmative Action Issue Weighs Heavily on Supreme Court,
Ricii. TIMES-DISPATCH, June 23, 2003, at A9.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44.
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Quixotically, the Court conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects individuals rather than groups, 2 3  but proceeded to employ the
group-logic that is the essence of affirmative action. The majority ac-
knowledged that Marks had "baffled and divided the lower courts,
'
"232
and then obliquely, although not expressly, applied that decision to ex-
tract from Bakke a holding that the attainment of diversity in the law-
school setting is a compelling state interest.23 3
Regarding diversity as a compelling state interest was the linchpin in
the majority's approval of the law school's affirmative action program.2 34
Once the Court made this determination, the "narrowly tailored" re-
quirement was a natural consequence. If racial diversity were innately a
compelling state interest, then there was in fact no other way to attain
this goal other than to take race into account in making admissions deci-
sions. The Court found that the law school's method carried "the
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan, ' 235 again referring to Justice Pow-
ell's language in Bakke that admissions decisions must be made on an
individualized basis that uses race in a "flexible, nonmechanical way."
2 36
The majority in Grutter found that the Michigan Law School plan was not
a quota system that imposes a "fixed number or proportion of opportuni-
ties that are 'reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.' ,237 Justice
O'Connor likened the law school's use of race to Harvard's, having given
race more weight than other factors, but not in a rigid manner. 238
It is somewhat of an enigma that Justice O'Connor referred to her own
opinion in Croson regarding the necessity of applying the strict scrutiny
test,23 9 since Croson also held that societal discrimination, as opposed to
actual prior discrimination, cannot justify affirmative action.240 One ac-
ceptable justification sufficed. Since the Court had determined Bakke to
permit racial preferences to achieve diversity, there was no need to find
yet another ground to uphold the program. She clarified by reminding
that the Court had never held that the "only governmental use of race
231. Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
232. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46).
233. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. Justice O'Connor's opinion seemingly paid unequivocal
deference to the late Justice Powell, regardless of the usual consensus that the Bakke Court
was too fractured to have produced any real precedent as to the diversity issue.
234, Id. at 327-28.
235. Id. at 334.
236. Id. at 334 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-16).
237. Id. at 335 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 496).
238. Id. at 335-39. Note that Justice Powell had written commendably of the Harvard
plan in his opinion distinguishing it from the University of California Davis' Medical
School plan, the latter which he viewed to be a quota. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-24.
239. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
240. Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-97.
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that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. 24 1 Jus-
tice Ginsburg's concurring opinion emphasized this same position- i.e.,
that either diversity attainment or past discrimination would justify af-
firmative action, factors which are to be viewed in the disjunctive rather
than the conjunctive. 42 This view holds that the interest in diversity
alone is sufficient to legitimate racial preferences, and remedy of prior
discrimination might be yet another separate justification.243
Perhaps the most intriguing part of the majority opinion was the ratio-
nale of the benefits of diversity in the study of law. The Court referred to
the trial court's concession that the law school's admissions policy pro-
motes "'cross-racial understanding', helps to break down racial stereo-
types, and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races'. . ., benefits [which are] 'important and laudable,' because 'class-
room discussion is livelier, more spirited. . .,,,244 This was actually an
extract from the trial court's statement that reflected upon testimony at
trial, not the direct opinion of the court. The federal district judge had
then gone on to distinguish between "viewpoint diversity and racial diver-
sity," stating that the "educational benefits of the former are
clear, . . .[but] those of the latter are less so."2 45
Justice O'Connor lent much credence to amici briefs from large U.S.
businesses in which the increase in globalization was cited as requiring
exposure to "widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. "246
The majority viewed such diversity as necessary to prepare students for
"work and citizenship" in that it allowed "participation by members of all
racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation .. ."247 Her readi-
ness to accept Justice Powell's viewpoint in Bakke, which cited the impor-
tance of racial diversity in the academic setting, appeared to this writer to
be inductive rather than deductive reasoning, not usual in legal analysis.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's allegiance to Justice Powell seemed to
have pre-ordained her conclusion such that her opinion was a discourse in
justifying the outcome that would occur.
241. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added).
242. Id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 330 (quoting Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 850).
245. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
246. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (citing Brief for 3M et al as Amicus Curiae, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No 02-241) and Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus
Curiae).
247. Id. at 331-32.
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The majority's reference to Sweatt v. Painter2 4s to stress the significance
of a black component in the law school setting was puzzling indeed.
Sweatt had involved a public law school's expressed exclusion of blacks
rather than the University of Michigan's method of inclusion.249 The
plaintiff in Sweatt was a black applicant who had been rejected by the law
school because of the color of his skin z.25 0 The instant litigation, however,
was a reverse-discrimination suit. Barbara Grutter was a white applicant
who had been allegedly rejected because of the preference given to black
applicants.
Justice O'Connor referred to the mystical qualities of diversity as "sub-
stantial."'25  Again, she cited Justice Powell in Bakke when he referred to
racial diversity as a "contribut[ion to] the robust exchange of ideas., 25 2
Her holding, that a diverse student body is a compelling state interest,2 5 3
failed to explain how an amalgam of students of different races might
somehow produce a more intellectual or stimulating discussion of the law.
With regard to the loss visited upon Barbara Grutter and other non-
minorities whom she represented, the Court termed this approval of con-
sideration of race as only a temporary measure, 254 one that is approved
until the amorphous goal of eliminating the need for such preferences-a
circuitous explanation provided by the Court-has been achieved. 5 If a
critical mass of blacks is significant, even central, to the law school's mis-
sion, would not an assurance be in order that such mass always be present
in the student body? The closest Justice O'Connor came to predicting
when these admissions policies would reap a benefit to all was her "ex-
pect[ation] that twenty-five years from now" racial preferences would no
longer be necessary to attain the diversity desired.2 5 6 Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, reiterated this hope for a
"logical end point, ' 257 but did so without venturing to predict when that
time might be.
248. Id. at 332-33. Chief Justice Vinson retorted that law schools "cannot be effective
in isolation from the individuals and institutions from which the law interacts." Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
249. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629.
250. Id.
251. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324.
252. Id. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
253. Id. at 325.
254. See id. at 343 (presuming good faith that university officials will terminate the
admissions policies as soon as practicable).
255. Id. (citing Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik., The Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Cull. BAR REC.
282, 293 (May-June 1977).
256. Id. at 343.
257. Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
[Vol. 7:23
MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS
Dissents
Though each of the four justices in the minority wrote a separate opin-
ion, there was a clear parallel in their holdings. The crux of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent was his disagreement with the majority's decision to
veer away from the traditionally approved strict scrutiny analysis for all
racial classifications.2 5 8 The majority's blanket approval of the attain-
ment of student body diversity as the university's primary purpose was
sharply castigated by the Chief Justice.2 59 He declared that a comparison
between the greater number of admitted blacks to the number of admit-
ted American Indians and Hispanics illustrated a contradiction to the al-
leged goal.2 6 ° Justice Rehnquist's refusal to endorse a constitutional
permission for the law school to exercise "such free rein in the use of
race"261 was buttressed by his dismay over the absence of any precise
time frame for this patent discrimination to have run its useful course.
2 6 2
The proposed twenty-five year period suggested by Justice O'Connor was
not in reference to any of the law school's evidence, but merely a conjec-
ture that the Chief Justice found untenable. 63
Justice Kennedy echoed the Chief Justice's concern over the Court's
abandonment of strict scrutiny analysis, writing that "[t]he Court con-
fuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective
with deference to the implementation of this goal. ' '2 ' He termed the law
school's "critical mass" concept as a "delusion used ... to mask its at-
tempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve
numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas. ' '265 Justice Kennedy's
conclusion was that the Court's approval of the law school's obvious fail-
ure to give individual consideration to each applicant was an application
of a standard far beneath a strict one.26 6
Justice Scalia classified the law school's "mystical 'critical mass' justifi-
cation for its discrimination by race... [as one which] challenges even the
258. See id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (declaring the holding to be an "un-
precedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny analysis.. .'). Even Justice Pow-
ell, in his Bakke opinion, wrote that strict scrutiny must apply to all racial distinctions,
including those that favored minorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (holding that every
person is protected by the Constitutional guarantee against classifications that are not
"precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest").
259. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (pronouncing that the
alleged goal of critical mass is a sham).
260. Id. at 380-83.
261. Id. at 386.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 386-87 (regarding the time-frame as vague and ambiguous).
264. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 389.
266. Id. at 392-95.
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most gullible mind ... [a] sham to cover a scheme of racially proportion-
ate admissions. '267 He viewed the "diversity" rationale as something
nebulous that will not be reflected on a student's law school transcript,
but a "lesson of life rather than law."'268 In Scalia's view, perhaps such
racial diversity will make students better citizens, but clearly not better
law students, or ultimately, better lawyers.269 Justice Scalia reminded the
Court that the Constitution prohibits all racial discrimination and con-
cluded, "I do not look forward" to the superfluity of cases the majority
opinion will likely generate.2
Justice Thomas' lengthy dissent struck the reader as one coming from
the soul. He began with a quote from Frederick Douglas, a former slave
born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1818, speaking in 1865 to an abolitionist
group:
What I ask for the Negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy,
but simply justice.... And if the Negro cannot stand on his own legs, let
him fall. . . . All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs!
Leave him alone. .... Your interference is doing him positive injury.27 1
The Constitution, Justice Thomas continued, "does not ... tolerate in-
stitutional devotion to the status quo in admissions policies when such
devotion ripens into racial discrimination. '272 He was perplexed by the
Court's failure to address its earlier explicit holding in Wygant-that
there was no compelling state interest in advancing diversity in the public
education setting with regard to the requirement for strict scrutiny analy-
sis.273 He was further puzzled by the majority's departure from past
holdings that there was no public interest in general societal discrimina-
tion without evidence of actual discrimination. 274 Furthermore, Justice
267. Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268. Id. at 348.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 349.
271. Id. at 349-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Frederick Douglas, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massa-
chusetts (Jan. 26, 1865), in JOHN W. BLASSINGAME & JOHN R. McKIVIGAN, THE FREDRICK
DOUGLASS PAPERS - SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS, 1864-1880, at
59, 68 (1991)).
272. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. Id. at 352 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275-76). Interestingly, Wygant also re-
garded affirmative action in Michigan public schools, but at the primary and secondary,
rather than the university level. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270-71. In Wygant, the Court held
preferential treatment afforded to black teachers when layoffs became necessary violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 282-84.
274. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 and Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-98). Justice O'Connor actually
wrote the principal opinion in Croson, in which the Court struck down an affirmative ac-
tion program because it viewed it as requiring quotas. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-11.
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Thomas expressed that social classifications are demeaning and held "that
such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual
our society.
27 5
Perhaps the most fundamental portion of Justice Thomas' dissent was
his criticism of the majority's failure to find a true state interest,276 which
reminded the reader of Justice Scalia's distinction between benefits that
are arguably social and those that are educational.2 7 7 The majority
viewed the former as educationally beneficial, a position Justice Thomas
strongly challenged.2 78 He berated the Court for its failure to explain
without any clarity how racial diversity will improve one's legal educa-
tion.2 79 Justice Thomas saw no public interest in Michigan even maintain-
280ing a law school at all, pointing out that the vast majority of University
of Michigan Law School graduates leave the state upon graduation, with
less than 16% remaining in Michigan. 8 1
Assuming arguendo that diversity is nonetheless a valid and compelling
state interest, Justice Thomas referred to the amicus curiae brief filed by
the federal government in support of the plaintiffs to reiterate that racial
discrimination was not a necessary means.2 82 This brief discussed race-
neutral alternatives successfully practiced in Texas, Florida, and Califor-
nia. 283 This, Justice Thomas suggested, should be in lieu of granting pref-
erential treatment in admissions decisions based solely on the skin color
of the applicant.
28 4
Finally, Justice Thomas addressed some fissures in the underlying logic
to the law school's primary focus on race, rather than on other qualities
of the applicants. He queried as to why black men are not considered
underrepresented by the law school when compared with black wo-
men.28 5 The American Bar Association-Law School Admissions Council
(ABA-LSAC) Guide (page 426) reported forty-six black women and
275. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
276. Id. at 354-55 (indicating that the state interest is a masked form of racial
balancing).
277. See supra text accompanying note 269.
278. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 358.
281. Id. at 359.
282. Id. at 361-62.
283. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae at 13-14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No 02-241) (favoring admission policies that factor race-neutral qualities
such as economical, geographical, and political diversity).
284. Grutter, 538 U.S. at 361-62 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
285. Id. at 372.
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twenty-eight black men enrolled in the law school.28 6 What was the rea-
son, he asked, why no action had been taken to address this under-
representation of black men? 287 Moreover, he agreed with Chief Justice
Rehnquist that the exaggerated preference given to black applicants over
other minorities amounted to inter-minority discrimination.288
Justice Thomas, a Harvard Law School graduate, deplored the stigma
imposed on deserving qualified blacks created by affirmative action.2 89
In his opinion, admission policies that employed racial discrimination tars
all black students, those who were the beneficiaries of affirmative action,
and those who would have qualified in the absence of racial
discrimination.2 90
Justice Thomas concluded that the Court had essentially endorsed an
unconstitutional policy, one that "weaken(ed) the principle of equality
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection
Clause."29' This position is the quintessence of the argument opposing
affirmative action.
Gratz v. Bollinger
292
Decided the same day as Grutter, Gratz concerned the affirmative ac-
tion program at the College of Literature, Science and the Arts at Uni-
versity of Michigan.293 However, unlike the law school plan, the Court
held that this program did not pass constitutional muster.294 Though a
federal district court had held the law school plan unconstitutional, 295 it
upheld the undergraduate's affirmative action.296 Ironically, the results
were reversed when the two cases were decided by the Supreme Court.
The trial court in Gratz upheld the plan, finding it sufficiently narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of attaining diversity in
the classroom. 2 97 Interlocutory appeals in Gratz were pending when the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district court and ap-
proved the law school program.2 98 The Supreme Court subsequently
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 375.
289. Id. at 373.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 378.
292. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
296. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
297. Id.
298. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
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granted certiorari on both cases without a decision by the appellate court
on the undergraduate program. When the cases reached the Supreme
Court, both affirmative action programs had been judicially approved.
The undergraduate admissions decisions were made on a maximum
150-point scale.299 Generally, applicants with 100 points were admit-
ted.300 Consideration was given to high school grades, Scholastic Apti-
tude Test scores (much like the leaving certificates in Ireland and
Northern Ireland), state residency, personal essays, personal achieve-
ments, alumni relationships, and membership in one of the same three
"underrepresented" minority groups. 30' However, applicants in the un-
derrepresented minority groups were automatically credited with 20
points, regardless of the other factors.302 This resulted in the admission
of virtually every minimally qualified minority applicant.30 3
A 6-3 Court held the college's additional point allocation to be a verita-
ble quota, which Justice Powell had held unconstitutional in his Bakke
opinion.3°4 The Court held this use of race to violate both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amendment and Title VI.305
Though Justices O'Connor and Breyer voted for the law school plan in
Grutter, they voted against the undergraduate plan. In O'Connor's con-
curring opinion joined by Breyer, the across-the-board lack of individual
consideration of each undergraduate applicant was criticized. 306 They ex-
plicitly reiterated their approval of the usage of race as a factor in order
to achieve diversity, provided it is used appropriately. 307 Justice Thomas'
concurring opinion stressed his view that the Equal Protection Clause
"categorically prohibited" any use of race in making admissions
decisions.308
It was submitted that it was difficult to ascertain any substantive dis-
tinction between the law school and undergraduate policies, and for this
299. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 266.
304. See id. at 269 (comparing the point allocation to an impermissible two-track
system).
305. Id. at 276. The significance of Title VI is its applicability to all educational insti-
tutions in receipt of federal aid, regardless of the school's private or public nature. The
Court has held that this requirement is met if a student in a private school has a federally
funded scholarship. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
306. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the current
admissions policy a "nonindividualized, mechanical one.").
307. See id. at 279 (arguing that diversity factors, such as race, should be individually
assessed).
308. Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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reason, the dissenters in Grutter remarked upon this puzzlement. In his
opinion in Grutter, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court's "split double-
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the
litigation."3"9
Conceding that the Bakke Court had held quotas to be patently uncon-
stitutional, 3 0 the line between the addition of points to enhance an appli-
cant's total score3'1 and the favorable recruitment of black students to
achieve a "critical mass"-3 12 is so fine as to be arguably nonexistent. The
end is the same, and the means, perceptibly indistinguishable.
Ironically, the results for the plaintiffs in Gratz and Grutter were oppo-
site at both the federal district court and Supreme Court levels:
Federal District Court Supreme Court
Gratz
(undergraduate) constitutional unconstitutional
Grutter (law school) unconstitutional constitutional
Reactions from the Press
Well-known newspaper writers lost no time in chastising and praising
the Court. However, most writers offered no explanation for the differ-
ences of the outcomes.
Opponents
Dr. Walter Williams, an African-American Economics professor at
George Mason University in Virginia and syndicated editorialist, pre-
dicted "racial fraud" as a result of Grutter.31 3 He mused that the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School's application will invite racial fraud.314 Since
the application gives students the option to choose "one race or ethnicity
that you think best applies to you" with no proof necessary, Caucasians
will lie in order to share in the bounty for the sake of diversity.31
5
Pondering the mysteries of the two decisions, syndicated editorialist
Paul Greenberg revisited his childhood experience in Arkansas as a son
309. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
310. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
311. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 355.
312. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381-83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (illustrating how the
law school's affirmative action favors blacks over Hispanics and American Indians).
313. Walter Williams, Since Ruling, Expect Racial Fraud, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Aug. 7, 2003, at A13.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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of a Jewish store-owner.31 6 While in elementary school, he realized the
difference in the treatment towards black children.317 He wrote that
"black people stopped where [school] began" and how he knew that seg-
regation "wasn't right, that race didn't matter." 3 8 As Greenberg re-
flected upon the changes in American race relations, he was bemused by
the opinion in Grutter.3 19 Since the ruling literally held that race does
indeed matter, he called it the "funniest Supreme Court decision I ever
read., 32" Greenberg sees a circular reversion to a less progressive time,
with racial discrimination being used by the Court to end discrimina-
tion.321 He concluded by writing, "I knew better than that when I was six
years old.'
322
Charles Krauthammer, another editorialist with the Washington Post,
called the Grutter opinion "incoherent, disingenuous, intellectually mud-
dled, and morally confused. 3 23 He stressed, however, that the Court did
not require affirmative action on a constitutional basis; rather, the Court
permitted it. 324 In Dr. Krauthammer's view, since Grutter pointed to no
constitutional mandate, this ruling left it to the people and the legislators
to dispense with the practice.325
The Center for Equal Opportunity, a think-tank in northern Virginia,
had hoped that the Court would declare affirmative action in the public
sector unconstitutional.326 General Counsel Roger Clegg announced the
Center's disappointment in the Grutter decision because the Court did
not "put an end ... to all of this nonsense., 32 7
Press Syndicate editorialist John Leo referred to Grutter as the Court's
endorsement of "[i]nsulation from real competition. ' 328 He read the de-
cision as furthering a system that "reflects the patronizing notion that
316. Paul Greenburg, You've Got to Discriminate to End Discrimination, RICH.
TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 30, 2003, at A9.
317. Id.
318. Id. These events were prior to the landmark case requiring racial desegregation
of public primary and secondary schools, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
319. Greenburg, supra note 316.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Charles Krauthammer, Ruling Puts the Ball Back in Proper Court, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 27, 2003, at A19.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Hardin, supra note 225.
327. Id.
328. John Leo, Supreme Court Declared Quotas fIlegal, Legal - Go Figure, RICH.
TIMi'S-DISPATCH, July 6, 2003, at E3.
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blacks and Latinos cannot be expected to compete like members of other
groups.,
329
A bit of levity emanated from the reaction of some university students
who took issue with affirmative action in general. Similar actions at two
prestigious Virginia universities-one private, one public-are illustra-
tive. In 2003, students at both the College of William and Mary, a public
educational institution and the second-oldest university (after Harvard)
in the United States, and the University of Richmond, a private Baptist
school, organized so-called "affirmative action bake sales.,
330
A sign posted at one such function at William and Mary advertised
cookies at prices that were affixed to a particular race.3 3 ' White purchas-
ers were charged at four for $1.00; Asians were charged four for 75¢;
blacks. at four for 50¢; and to American Indians, at four for 25€.33' An
identical incident had preceded this event at the University of Rich-
mond.33 3 Both the administration of William and Mary and the college's
Student Assembly Senate strongly condemned such bake sales. 334 The
Office of Student Affairs shut down the affirmative action bake sale and
ordered that the sign be removed, while the Student Senate passed a res-
olution rebuking the activity.3 3 5 The chair of the, Department of Sociol-
ogy "wrote an open letter to the William and Mary community,"
acknowledging the students' constitutional right to free speech, but de-
nounced their "lack of enlightenment. "336
Similar "affirmative action bake sales" were held by College Republi-
cans at the University of Washington, some of whom were physically at-
tacked by protesters, University of California Irvine, Northwestern
University (Chicago) and Southern Methodist University (Dallas). 33 7 All
of the activities were shut down by campus administrators after they de-
clared the events to be "discriminatory. "338
Viewed as an avenue to "expose the unjust nature of the racial prefer-
ences so fervently embraced by colleges and universities," Barton Hinkle,
a respected editorialist for the Richmond Times-Dispatch, perceived the
bake sales to be no different than the affirmative actions approved in
329. Id.
330. See A. Burton Hinkle, Campus Bake Sale Raises Awareness, Hostility, RicHi.
TIMEs-DIsPArCH, Dec. 23, 2003, at A9.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
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Grutter-both employed disparaging treatment based on race.3 39 Moreo-
ver, he concluded that "[p]erhaps affirmative action's defenders yelp so
loudly against protest bake sales because the sting they feel is the prick-
ing of their own consciences.,
340
Advocates
Those who lauded Grutter were no less vocal. It seemed a bit of an
anachronism, however, that the non-diverse historically all-black colleges
in Virginia praised the holding. Administrators of such schools as Presi-
dent William R. Harvey of Hampton University cited Grutter as a "vic-
tory for higher education," and President Marie McDemmond of Norfolk
(Virginia) State University was pleased with the holding that diversity
was an "important component to the learning environment." 34' Similar
statements came from leading administrators at Virginia Union Univer-
sity (private) and Virginia State University (public); both schools are pri-
marily black institutions.342
The administrative spokesman for the College of William and Mary
confirmed that race was already one among various factors in what he
termed a "holistic approach" to an applicant's admissions packet.3 43
Washington and Lee University, a private Virginia university where Jus-
tice Powell obtained his law degree, declared that the holding was a
"hoped-for decision."'  Virginia Governor Mark Warner proclaimed
that he, a person with a background in both business and law, was "heart-
ened ... [since he] think[s] most business[es] . . . want ... employees ...
educated in an environment where they were exposed to diverse people
and ideas.
345
An unusual, but positive, take came from black columnist Leonard
Pitts. He reminded that a "de facto" affirmative action historically bene-
fited whites until the Court forced integration as a matter of law.3 46 Pitts
advocated the use of affirmative action until this "nation. . .no
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Ren6e Petrina, Historically Black Schools Pleased with Ruling, Ricu. TIMES-Dis-
PATCH, June 24, 2003, at A6.
342. Id.
343. Hinkle, supra note 330.
344. Andrew Petkofsky, Va. Schools Seem to Comply, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, June
24, 2003, at Al.
345. Id.
346. Leonard Pitts, Is Affirmative Action's End in Sight?, RICH. TIMES-DISI'ATCII,
June 28, 2003, at A lt.
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longer. . .needs to."' 34 7 Unlike Justice O'Connor, however, he did not
surmise when that time might be. 348
Disappointed at an Absence of Judicial Guidance
Students from other institutions of higher education seemed discour-
aged, however, by the Court's lack of clarity. Dwight Norris, a student at
Virginia's James Madison University, opined that "[e]ither we should get
rid of it [affirmative action], or we should keep it. I don't see how this in-
between [contradiction between Grutter and Gratz] is helping out at
all. 349
Virginia Attorney General Jerry Kilgore summed up what was perhaps
the consensus of most by stating that the Court's two contrasting deci-
sions "did not provide us with a 'bright line' rule on the use of
race. . . ."" Patrick McSweeney of Richmond, a constitutional lawyer
and former Republican Party chairman of the state, agreed, saying that
he was "looking at an inch and a half or two inches of [high court] opin-
ions," adding that he does not "think it adds anything to clarify the law.
If anything, it further confuses the law."'35 1
IV. SOME COMPARISONS WITH POLICING IN POST-GOOD FRIDAY
AGREEMENT NORTHERN IRELAND
The conflict in Northern Ireland has been a legendary and long-run-
ning one, widely reported not only in Ireland and the United Kingdom,
but also in the United States. The much lauded Good Friday Agreement
(GFA) of April 10, 1998,352 inspired hope that peace would finally be a
reality in the six counties that constitute Northern Ireland.353
Among the more contentious provisions of the document were those in
the section addressing the reorganization of the former Royal Ulster
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Petkofsky, supra note 344.
350. Id.
351. Hardin, supra note 225.
352. Good Friday Agreement, Apr. 10, 1998, U.K.-Ir., 37 I.L.M. 751 [hereinafter
GFA].
353. See CLOSE Up FOUND., N. liz. (Nov. 1998) (providing an overview of the situa-
tion in Northern Ireland), at http://www.closeup.org/nireland.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004). The seemingly insurmountable difficulties of the GFA (and implementing legisla-
tion) since its historic signing is a subject beyond this article. The Northern Ireland Assem-
bly remains in suspension at this writing.
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Constabulary (RUC), now the Police Service of Northern Ireland.3 54
Pursuant to the GFA, an eight-member independent commission, led by
Chris Patten,3 55 was established on June 3, 1998. After more than a year
of lengthy and detailed meetings, this body, the Independent Commission
on Policing (hereinafter the "Patten Commission"), produced a 128-page
document (hereinafter the "Patten Report") containing 175
recommendations. 3
56
One recommendation was a quota system, which would be patently il-
legal in the United States, requiring that all new hires be 50% Protestant
and 50% Catholic. 3 57 Predictably, the majority unionist party, David
Trimble's Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), was firmly opposed to such a
quota.- - The more extreme unionist party, the Reverend Ian Paisley,
Sr.'s Democratic Ulster Party (DUP),3 59 adamantly riled against such a
preferential system.360 To be sure, this was affirmative action at its most
extreme.
As was expected, both of the significant nationalist parties, SinnFin
and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), praised the proposed
quotas.36' In general, however, the Patten Report and ensuing legislation
354. Only a few pages of the agreement dealt with the policing issue. See GFA, supra
note 352, at 22-24 (establishing an independent policing reviewing commission and man-
dating a report by Summer 1999).
355. Chris Patten was a prominent British Conservative politician and the last British
Governor of Hong Kong. See, e.g., Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Chris Patten, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChrisPatten (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
356. INDEP. COMM'N ON POLICING IN N. IR., A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN N. IR.
(1999) [hereinafter PATTEN REPORT].
357. Id. at 83, 118. These recommendations were later incorporated into the reactive
legislation. See Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000, c. 32, § 46(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter Po-
lice Act].
358. Patten Plan 'a Shoddy Document', BELFAST NFws-LE-rrER, July 29, 2000, at 9.
359. The result of the November 2003 elections in Northern Ireland was a dramatic
shift in partisan power. Not only did the DUP reap votes for a significantly greater num-
ber than did the UUP, thus becoming the strongest unionist party, but the DUP now has
more seats in the still-suspended Northern Ireland Assembly than does any other party,
unionist and nationalist.
The results of the 1998 Assembly elections were UUP, 28 members, and DUP, 20
members. The 2003 votes gave the DUP 30 members to only 27 for the UUP. In late
January, 2004, 30 members of then-First Minister David Trimble's UUP constituency asso-
ciation resigned, and 3 UUP elected Assembly members-Jeffrey Donaldson, Arlene Fos-
ter, and Norah Beare-left their party and joined the DUP. Thereafter, the DUP had 33
Assembly members to the UUP's 24. One journalist categorized the UUP as a "party in
turmoil". Dan Keenan, Trimble Faces Setback: 3 Defected as 30 Leave, IRIsI TIMI-_s, Jan.
26, 2004, at 6.
360. See generally PAYFEN REPORr, supra note 356.
361. See Joe Carroll, Adams Accuses Mandelson of Emasculating Patten Recommen-
dations, IISHI TIMES, July 11, 2000, at 6; see also Bruce Arnold, Who Do We Blame for
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included something to agitate every party. To the unionists, it was a
deplorable and blatant means of pandering to the nationalists; to the na-
tionalists, although they were tacitly pleased with the quota, it did not go
far enough.36 2 Sinn Fin, in particular, while presumably delighted with
the recommended quotas, wanted even greater concessions for the na-
tionalists.36 3 The SDLP actually called for a dismantling of the RUC in
its entirety.3
64
This restructuring and re-naming is now a fait accompli. The former
RUC is now the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)-the word
"service" rather than "force" or "constabulary" emphasizes the down-
sized and non-militaristic post-GFA security personnel.3 6 5 The imple-
menting legislation officially changed the name of the former RUC.366 In
the view of the SDLP, the word "royal" in any sense was reprehensible as
being "overtly British. '3 67 Surprisingly, the mail service officially re-
mains the Royal Mail.
The Alliance, a neutral party on the nationalist-unionist issue, ap-
proved of both the Patten Report and the proposed statute in general,
but nonetheless took great issue with the quota-in-hiring policy.36 8 There
is much merit to Alliance's opinion that such preferential treatment likely
violates the Fair Employment Act.3 69
Understandably, the RUC itself objected not only to the quota, but
also to most of the visible changes.3 7 ° In its substantial response to each
What Has Happened?, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Nov. 29, 2003, at 8; Associate Press, Limit on
RUC Reform Debate in Commons 'Deeply Insensitive', IRISII TIMES, July 12, 2000, at 6
[hereinafter Limit on RUC].
362. Carroll, supra note 361; Limit on RUC, supra note 361.
363. SDLP, the strongest nationalist party at the time of execution of the GFA and
voting for Assembly members, is now a distant second to Sinn Fain. The 1998 elections
gave SDLP 24 Assembly members to Sinn Fin's 18. In 2004, these numbers were exactly
reversed. SDLP now has only 18 members to Sinn Fin's 24. Because of the striking shift
on both sides so that the two most extreme unionist and nationalist parties were the most
powerful, journalist Bruce Arnold penned that "[tlhe GFA, in its present form, is finished."
Arnold, supra note 361.
364. See Vincent Browne, Political Prophet, but not in His Own Country, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2001, at 12.
365. PATTEN REPORT, supra note 356.
366. Police Act, c. 32, § 46(1) (Eng.).
367. SDLP, POLICING: A NEW SERVICE FOR A NEW FUTURE 10 (1999).
368. THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND, THE REPORT OF THE INDEPEN-
DENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND paras. 11.1, 12.2-12.5.
369. Id. at para. 12.2.
370. TlE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, RESPONSE TO TlHE REPORT OF THE INDE-
PENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND 75-76. See generally PAT-
TEN REPORT, supra note 356.
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recommendation, the re-naming and changes of symbols were especially
problematic.
37 1
Interestingly, Chris Patten, then-Chair of the British Conservative
(Tory) Party and member of Westminster Parliament, is himself a Catho-
lic. 372 Perhaps the relationship between his political position and his re-
ligion was not coincidental; it is conceivable that Catholicism was a factor
in selecting him. The purpose might have been to assure the public that
the Chair, as a British subject, was not overly unionist. Significantly, both
Patten and Westminster responded to a decades-old pattern of anti-Cath-
olic discrimination.37 3 At the time of the signing of the GFA, the secta-
rian composition of the RUC was 88% Protestant and 8% Catholic.
374
This Catholic-Protestant animosity lies at the heart of Northern Ireland's
troubles.
The GFA, however, is unarguably a "politically correct" instrument.
Nationalists' aversion to the "political symbols," such as the United King-
dom flag (the "Union Jack") was assuaged by the Patten Commission's
recommendation to remove both the crown (British) and the shamrock
(Irish) from the RUC symbol 375 and to cease flying the country flag of
which Northern Ireland is a political part.37 6
Moreover, there had been recurring charges of anti-Catholic activity on
the part of the RUC. From April 19, 1969 to January 27, 1974, state se-
curity agents in Northern Ireland had killed 350 persons. Of those, only
39 (11%) were Protestants, whereas, 305 (85%) were Catholics. 377 One
allegation of the RUC complicity came after the brutal car-bombing mur-
der of Rosemary Nelson, a nationalist solicitor who had long worked for
the human rights cause. Similar charges came in the 1999 murder of Pat
371. THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, supra note 370 (responding to PATrEN
REPORT).
372. Browne, supra note 364. Upon his appointment to Chair the Commission, Patten
(who later became European Minister for External Affairs) referred to himself as one who
was "born, brought up, remain, and will die a Catholic".
373. The term "decades" is used here rather loosely, strictly in reference to partition
of the island of Ireland by act of Westminster in 1920. Effective 1922, the six counties
which are Northern Ireland remained a part of the United Kingdom, and the twenty-six
counties in the South and Northwest attained dominion status as the Free State of Ireland
(Saorsidt Eireann). In reality, governmental oppression of Catholics began with British
control over all of Ireland in 1171 during the reign of King Henry I1.
374. FIONNULA Ni AOLIAN, THE PoLrrics OF FORCE 91 (2000). The remaining 4%
were listed as "religion unknown".
375. PAITEN REPORT, supra note 356.
376. Id.
377. AOLIAN, supra note 374, at 248.
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Finucane, a high profile Catholic barrister who defended several
Republicans.378
It is germane to point to other perceptions, if not realities, of such dis-
criminatory treatment of Catholics. Other areas where rampant anti-
Catholic policies were alleged were in housing and gerrymandering of
political districts. An example of such a district that has remained
strongly unionist because of the localizing of Catholic public housing is
Enniskillen, County Fermanagh. Political scientist Graham Gudgeon re-
ferred to this as "malpractice to maintain Unionist control." '3 79 Edward
Carson proudly hailed the new 1922 Northern Ireland Parliament as a
"Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people," surely not a statement
indicative of religious tolerance.38 °
To contrast with the affirmative action plan approved in Grutter, there
was no evidence introduced that the University of Michigan Law School
had engaged in any racial discrimination in the past. Rather, the attempt
was solely to achieve the mysterious "diversity" that the Court viewed as
intellectually beneficial to the entire student body.38' Indeed, the Court's
blind allegiance to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is puzzling in light of
his denouncement of the legitimacy of using affirmative action to remedy
"societal discrimination. 382
On the other hand, the GFA affirmative action recommendation was
directed toward actual past discrimination,38 3 often more than de facto,
and actually sanctioned by the government.3 1 The 50-50 quota proposal
was intended to level the playing field, so to speak, by evening out the
composition of a security force that must maintain the respect and trust
of both sides of the religious-political dispute.3 85 The Commission's ap-
378. Ms. Nelson represented the Catholic group that opposes the July 12 Orange Or-
der march through the Catholic residential in Drumcree, near Portadown. See ROSEMARY
NELSON: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A HUMAN RiGrrs DEFENDER 23, 24 (Pat Finucane
Centre, 1999). On March 25, 1999, she was killed as she left her driveway in Lurgan,
County Down when a booby-trap style bomb that had been planted in her car exploded.
Id. Suspicions of RUC complicity in her murder surfaced. Id. In 1989, Finucane was shot
and killed while having dinner with his family in his affluent Belfast home.
379. GRAHAM GRUDGEON, TiE NORTHERN IRELANI) QUESTrON: NATIONALISM,
UNIONISM AND PARTITrON 105 (Patrick J. Roche & Brian Barton eds., 1999).
380. Edward Henry Carson (1854-1935), a barrister unofficially referred to as the "un-
crowned king of Ulster," fought adamantly in opposition to Home Rule for Ireland.
381. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
382. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
383. PATrEN REPORT, supra note 356, at 81-83 (addressing the actual discrimination
found in the representation of Catholics and other minorities within the police force).
384. Police Act, c. 32, § 46(1) (Eng.).
385. PAI'EN REPORT, supra note 356, at 81-83.
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proach, and the later approach of Westminster, directly addressed the
ongoing cause of the ongoing conflict.3 86
Beyond the security sector in Northern Ireland, a mention of the em-
ployment setting in general is instructive. One body crafted out of the
enacted legislation pursuant to the GFA was the Equality Commission
whose statutory duty was to ensure equality of opportunity.387 Expressly
stated in the statute is the duty of the Equality Commission to investigate
all charges of violations.388 Similar to the U.S. Constitution's Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 389 this law applied to "public authorities. ' 39" The concept
of public versus private, however, was given a much broader interpreta-
tion. For example, the courts in the Republic of Ireland have generally
interpreted "public" protections in the Constitution of Ireland to extend
to private persons. 391 The post-GFA statute for Northern Ireland also
contained an exhaustive list of these titular "public" bodies. 392 Gener-
ally, "public" denotes not only the government, but also a private com-
pany that services the public.
The statutory duty of the "public authorities" is to have and exercise
"due regard ... [to] promote equality."393 Since anti-Catholic discrimina-
tion in Northern Ireland had been the absolute motive of the retaliatory
actions by nationalist paramilitaries (e.g., the IRA), it is a contemporary
provocation for violence that affects the people in general. Therefore,
the word "promote" had a positive and proactive connotation, an ex-
pressly stated directive to practice affirmative action.
394
Contrary to the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
plan in Grutter, the GFA quota provision responded directly to actual
prior and current discrimination, not to any "societal" discrimination so
detested by the Grutter dissents.395 Justice Powell's own insistence in
Bakke was that mere societal discrimination was not a constitutional
ground for preferential treatment. 396
386. Id.
387. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, §§ 73-74 (Eng.) (supervising the issues of disa-
bility, employment, racial equality and equal opportunity).
388. Id. at § 74.
389. U.S. CONS-r. amend. XIV, § 1.
390. Northern Ireland Act, c. 47, § 75(1)(a)-(d).
391. From his interpretation of trade union cases, Irish employment law expert,
Michael Forde, concluded that private sector employers in Ireland are bound by constitu-
tional provisions. See MICHAEL FORDE, EMPLOYMENT LAW 7 (1992).
392. Northern Ireland Act, c. 47, § 75(3)(a)-(d).
393. Id. at § 75(l)
394. Id. at §§ 73-75.
395. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
396. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
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Interestingly, the term "due regard," as used in the Northern Ireland
statute,397 was adopted after considerable debate in Westminster since
Parliament desired to require something beyond simple "regard." '398
Northern Ireland's former Secretary of State, Marjorie "Mo" Mowlam,
identified the words "equality" and "good relations" as tandem concepts,
not conflicting or opposing ones. 39 9 Such statements also reflected a
probable intent to sanction affirmative action because of a pervasive pat-
tern of province-wide discrimination. Significantly, however, the statute
spoke of "equality of opportunity,40 0 rather than a granting of preferen-
tial treatment for Catholics who, as a group, had been the targets of dis-
crimination.4° ' Arguably, this inferred an unspoken stance of sorts, the
legislature's goal to require full consideration of Catholic job applicants
for jobs or public housing. The legendary jury is still out as to whether
this facially middle position, which clearly promotes more than mere
"equality," goes as far as affirmative action, the most extreme position.40 2
The fundamental problem in Northern Ireland, however, was rooted in
religious backgrounds and political differences, and for that reason, it was
logical to assume that some modicum of positive discrimination was nec-
essary to dispose of prior preferential treatment to Protestants.
It is submitted that therein lay the underlying differences between the
affirmative action approved by the Court in Grutter and the quota system
for the PSNI. The latter does not require any specific pre-hire qualifica-
tions.40 3 Any approval of preferential treatment that might be read into
the GFA and subsequent legislation is applied to all persons, across the
board, without regard to any requisite qualifications. Examples of quali-
fications might be past experience or a minimum amount of education.
(To transfer into the housing sector, "qualifications" might be a proven
need.) On the other hand, the University of Michigan Law School
looked first at the race of an applicant and, only thereafter, at other quali-
fications, such as the applicant's GPA and LSAT scores.40 4 The so-called
bottom line is that for the law school, race is the proverbial trump card,
regardless of aptitude scores or university undergraduate grades. The
397. Northern Ireland Act, c. 47, § 75(1).
398. House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 334, col. 109 (July 27, 1998).
399. Id.
400. Northern Ireland Act, c. 47, § 75 (emphasis added).
401. See PA-TFEN REPORT, supra note 356, at 81-83.
402. Northern Ireland Act, c. 47, § 75(l)(a)-(d) (listing nine areas where discrimina-
tion, presumably any discrimination, was forbidden).
403. See PAT[TEN REPORT, supra note 356, at 87 (calling for a standard of merit that
must be met by all eligible recruits, without any value given to "religious or cultural iden-
tity, gender or ethnicity'").
404. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (pointing to the school's "longstanding commitment"
to racial and ethnic diversity).
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sole aim is to attain class with 10-17% black students, the enigmatic "criti-
cal mass." The goal, then, is not "equality," as is that of the GFA's quota
principle, but rather the attainment of an undefined "diversity."
Dr. John Stannard, my respected colleague at Queens University Bel-
fast School of Law, has explained a problem when the police hiring quota
is practiced. According to him, it has been extremely difficult to hire an
equal number of candidates according to religion. Very few Catholics ap-
ply to the force, which has historically been the case. Perhaps this can be
explained as being a vestige of the pre-GFA distrust of the security
forces. Whatever the reason, it is a reality.
Moreover, the city of Belfast is now even more segregated by religion
in working class areas than prior to the GFA. An alarming 98% of the
city's working class are strictly separated.4 ° 5 Likewise, 98% of Northern
Ireland's public housing remains segregated.40 6 One unnamed academic
quipped, "Belfast was always pretty bad, but this is the worst ever, and
may be the worst in Western Europe.7
There is no affirmative action plan that can remedy this entrenched
separation, at least not in the near future. It may well be that the ap-
proach taken in the GFA will initiate more integration, but there is no
certainty in this hope.
V. CONCLUSION
The allegorical road map through the chronology of the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of affirmative action yields some principles
with regard to when racial preferences might meet constitutional muster
and when not. At least the Court has been consistent in requiring a
showing of a compelling state interest and applying strict scrutiny analysis
to any racial distinctions in recent years. Quotas, at any rate patent ones,
are not constitutionally acceptable.
Nonetheless, many legal scholars bemoan Grutter for having muddied
the waters after the Court had begun to present some clear guidance in
this regard. These guidelines are no longer lucid ones, and questions per-
sist. For example, the Court has never adequately defined with any preci-
sion what it means by "diversity." Moreover, what is the Court's concept
of a "quota"? Once a university, or college within a university, has
achieved a nearly racially balanced student body, must the plan then be
terminated and all applicants-in education, or in the workforce or hous-
ing settings, or all-thereafter to be treated equally? Regarding educa-
405. David McKittrick, Bid to Break Sectarian Ghettos, IRISH INDEPENDENT, April 7,
2004, at 13.
406. Id.
407. Id.
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tional admissions decisions, how much of a differential between a non-
minority's cumulative undergraduate grade-point average and LSAT
scores and those of a minority applicant is constitutionally acceptable in
the name of "diversity"? Finally, how much might realistically be read
into Grutter with respect to how the Court will view affirmative action in
the private sector where statutory law, rather than the Constitution, is
applicable, especially in areas other than education?
Regarding the latter point, the pre-Grutter decisions do not reflect any
significant variance between the Court's views on affirmative action and
reverse discrimination under statutory and constitutional claims. Only
the former applies to the private sector, but the majority's trend propheti-
cally may well indicate its view that affirmative action is acceptable when
challenged on statutory grounds. Since this will likely affect many areas,
including employment, public accommodations, and education, echoes
from Grutter may well reverberate in unexpected venues.
Comparing racial affirmative action in the United States with the quota
for post-GFA police hiring in Northern Ireland, one distinction is that the
latter directly addresses the root cause-inter-religious conflict-of the
troubles that have plagued the province for so many years. On the other
hand, public-setting racial preferences, facially contrary to the U.S. Con-
stitution, and private-setting or public-setting affirmative action plans vio-
late the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The enslavement of American blacks
ended officially in 1863 with the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and in reality in 1865 at the conclusion of the Civil War, and the compre-
hensive civil rights legislation in 1964-forty years ago-all which effec-
tively branded all race discrimination unlawful. However, the religious
tension in Northern Ireland has survived the GFA, and some degree of
affirmative action is conceivably necessary to end discrimination, a dis-
crimination similar to what has long been contrary to American law.
Ironically, interracial friction has been revived and exacerbated by the
Grutter decision. The Court has deemed such inequality of treatment
necessary to achieve "diversity." It is submitted that this judicially ap-
proved inequality of treatment perpetuates an emphasis on the differ-
ences between racial groups-differences that the Constitution instructed
were to be ignored.
It could well be that the effect will be to solidify a wall of separation by
continuing to divide the races by such programs as the one permitted at
the University of Michigan. To the contrary, true equality would form
the intended bridge between the two races that continue to be divided by
such programs.
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